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ABSTRACT
In recent years, research efforts in cyber security have steadily increased as a result of
growing concerns for cyber attacks and also increasing trend in cyber attack incidents. One
of the important areas of research that is gaining importance is modeling of attacks and
countermeasures to quantify survivability and other security measures of interest. In this
context, on one extreme, attack trees model has received attention due to its simplicity and ease
of analysis, and on the other extreme, stochastic models have been advocated. While attack
trees model does not capture complex dependencies among events and also is not amenable for
modeling dynamic nature of the attacks and countermeasures, the fitness of stochastic models is
yet to be established as there is not sufficient evidence to show that attack and defense behaviors
follow some known distributions. With this motivation, a new attack modeling approach based
on Petri nets, called PENET, is developed in this thesis whose goal is to significantly enhance
the modeling power of attack trees. PENET introduces relevant concepts such as dynamic
nature of attack, repairability of a system, and the existence of recurring attacks. Moreover,
it attempts to find a balance between ease of use and representation power by providing set
of constructs, parameters, performance metrics, and time domain analysis of attack progress.
Time domain analysis produces valuable output such as time to reach the main goal and the
path taken by the attacker. This output helps to evaluate system survivability and defense
strategies. This approach is implemented as a software tool, called PENET Tool, which lets
users draw model diagrams of a given system through intuitive user interface, perform time
domain simulations and carry out security evaluations, and enable interactive ways to improve
the survivability of the system.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
With rise of cyber attack activities in recent years, more emphasis was given to research the
issues related to this phenomenon. One of such research efforts is modeling of cyber attacks
and countermeasures. Several modeling approaches have emerged in research community and
industry. In this context, most of existing approaches are based on two notable approaches,
one being attack trees, and second group of stochastic models.
As one of most popular modeling approaches with high impact, attack trees defined by
B. Scheneier [1] have been used to model attacker behavior with purpose of reaching some
compromise objective, such as system failure or root access. This modeling tool has proved
to be simple, easy to use and analyze results, but yet powerful in its modeling simplicity.
Beside modeling attacker behavior, attack trees have found similar use of modeling system
vulnerabilities and points of access. However, attack trees are limited to simple representations,
because of limited construct set and static nature. Our effort uses Petri net constructs to
augment and extend existing principles that are already proven useful in attack trees.
Attack tree structure heavily resembles to one of fault trees [11], and fault trees initially
consisted of simple constructs. Similarly, fault trees were extended with additional elements
such as dependency gate and priority AND gate that provide additional modeling capabili-
ties beyond initial fault tree set. Due to exponential distribution of events modeled by fault
trees, these additional gates can be converted to Markov chain representation, and analyzed
using standard techniques for solving stochastic Markov chains. Unfortunately, this analysis
approach cannot be used for purpose of extending attack trees because there is no evidence
that probability of attack success follows exponential distribution. Thus, this work proposes
2alternative analysis approach that does not imply stochastic nature of the events.
The purpose of our proposed approach, called Petri Net Attack Modeling approach (PENET)
is to provide intuitive modeling approach for modeling attacker behavior in vulnerable systems
in security sense, based on concepts of attack trees and modeling abilities of Petri nets. Second
purpose of PENET approach is to address issues present in attack trees and other attack mod-
els. For example, additional information for some events in attack tree model is often available
but useless due to limitations in modeling representation, yet attack trees suffer of imprecision
reflected by subjective assignments of values on its elements. This approach can be used from
modeling vulnerabilities of a single entity, to a whole enterprise level.
Structure of this thesis is as follows. Related research work is examined in following section.
Next, we provide quick overview of attack trees and Petri nets as both are basis of our approach.
Chapter 3 contains formal definition of proposed PENET approach and analysis methods.
Next two chapters are focused on PENET Tool, the software implementation of our approach.
Chapter 5 contains case study used to illustrate and simulate our approach. Finally, we provide
conclusion and future work.
The main contributions of this thesis are two-fold:
• Extending modeling capabilities of attack trees by using Petri net constructs in order to
significantly improve the analytical capabilities of attack trees, specifically by:
a) Addressing existing issues in attack trees such as limited representation power,
imprecision, and lack of defined defense modeling.
b) Introducing concepts of recurring attacks, defense modeling, and dynamic con-
structs.
c) Introducing an analysis approach that follows attack execution in time domain.
d) Providing means to evaluate system survivability and defense strategies.
• Developing software tool that implements new approach and establishes its practical use.
31.2 Related Work
Since attack tree incursion, significant research effort has been made to find application
for them, and to expand attack trees to new meaningful models. One of most prominent uses
of attack trees is in Mission-Oriented Risk and Design Analysis (MORDA) [10] methodology
developed by US National Security Agency. This methodology, shown on Figure 1.1, uses
attack trees in its process steps. The 10-steps process starts with identification of items that
are important in the process, namely system, adversary model, relevant missions, impact of
successful attack, and attack objectives. Acquired information is then used to build attack
trees that define attack space against which the system must defend. Last steps in this process
involve analysis of attack tree model, assessments, and finally practical action. Assessment
involves evaluation of risk based on attack tree analysis results, and sensitivity analysis of
input data. Finally, defense strategies can be employed based on completed assessment.
Fung et al. [4] provides attack tree of MANET network with intrusion goal to compromise
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) of critical channels containing key informa-
tion. Using service oriented architecture (SOA), authors analyze system and develop the attack
tree model that represent such SOA system. This work adds notion of survivability to attack
trees. Survivability analysis finds the system components susceptible to attacks an analyzes
their ability to survive the attacks. Based on attack tree, authors deduct intrusion scenarios
and provide quantitative values that determine which scenario has the lowest difficulty from
attacker standpoint.
Bistarelli et al. [5] introduce defense aspect in attack trees and additional quantitative
metrics such as return on investment (ROI) and return on attack (ROA). Defense trees are
attack trees extension that incorporate counter-measures used to address intrusion attempts
on leaves of attack trees. Higuero et al. [3] apply attack tree modeling to a case of digital
content security. Authors illustrate attack scenarios and provide analysis based on various
quantitative values that characterize attacker and attacker’s threats. Attack patterns were
introduced by Moore et al. [8] as a way to reuse generic segments or whole attack trees for
applicable contexts. Authors show how to apply generalized attack tree scenarios such as buffer
4overflow to their particular case study. The re-usability factor is very important in application
of attack tees.
Figure 1.1 Morda assessment [10] process steps
Attack trees are just one of many modeling approaches addressing security. Most of these
approaches were derived from existing methodologies used to model dependability and reliabil-
ity. Nicol et al. [12] provide overview of dependability and security modeling methods through
a taxonomy and motivate for further research in this area. These modeling approaches can
be divided to combinatorial, such as attack and fault trees, and stochastic, such as Markov
chains and Petri nets. Authors conclude that there is merit for using stochastic techniques in
attacker behavior modeling, but that significant additional work is required in order to create
new model-based framework.
Further, Dalton et al. [2] provide conversion of attack trees to generalized stochastic Petri
nets (GSPN) and perform steady state analysis of resulting GSPNs. Conversion methodology
is based on Petri net equivalent models for AND and OR event gates commonly used in attack
trees. The PIPE tool [13] was used to analyze derived Petri nets. McQueen et al. [19]
introduce compromise graphs. The goal of their work is to quantify risk reduction estimation
in a SCADA control system from cyber risk perspective. Quantitative risk model is defined
by risk of undesired event that takes into account probability and consequence of undesired
5event. Compromise graph is directed graph with nodes as potential attack states and edges as
successful compromises. Values on edges are expected time to compromise that are defined as
functions. As a main measure of system security and risk, authors used time to compromise
for base and enhanced systems. Also, authors recognize dominant attack path as a path with
minimal time to compromise.
Other approaches use stochastic models to describe systems. These models are commonly
converted to Markov chain, and analyzed using steady state transition matrix which contains
desired system metrics. Madan et al. [7] use dynamic state diagram to describe behavior of
intrusion tolerant system. This generic state diagram is a semi-Markov process model that is
further solved using embedded discrete time Markov chain (DTMC). Advantage of this work is
that presented generic model can be reused for specialized security attacks. The quantitative
analysis of model produces two useful metrics, steady-state availability and mean time to
security failure (MTTSF). Similarly, Sallhammar et al. in [6] develop stochastic model for
security and dependability evaluation. Their approach uses game theory to model attacker
behavior, as expected attacker behavior is driven by cost to perform attack and reward for
successful attack. In this stochastic model intrusions are modeled as transitions between system
states. Some system states are vulnerable to malicious faults, and game theory can be applied
to these states.
In [14], McDermott introduces attack nets that are derived from attack trees and Petri nets.
Attack net is a Petri net with states that represent point of security interests, and transitions
that represent events. Unlike other approaches that follow attack tree approach, this model is
intended for penetration testing. This model has capability to show how collection of seemingly
unrelated flaws can have larger consequence for a whole system.
In conclusion of related work, we find that stochastic models promise strong modeling power
that is lacking in attack trees. Unfortunately, due to fact that attacker behavior does not follow
any of known distribution functions used in stochastic models, we cannot use stochastic models
with defined probability distribution to develop precise attack model. However, other useful
attributes of stochastic models can be used. Our approach, which detailed description follows
6in next sections, will try to find compromise between modeling power of stochastic models and
simplicity of attack trees.
1.3 Foundations for Petri Net Attack Modeling Approach
1.3.1 Attack Trees
Attack trees are designed for the simplified evaluation of system security, often on the
enterprise system level. Attack trees offer methodological means to analyze security of the
system, such as its strengths and weaknesses with regards to intrusion attempts.
The principle of work of attack tree is simple and intuitive. Attack tree consists of three
parts: root, leaves and sub-tree components. Root describes access or achieveability of primary
goal, or compromise of desired system or a significant system module. Leaf nodes describe at-
tack attempts as indivisible simple actions. Sub-trees are used for description of dependence
of its children for achieving the upper goal. Sub-tree components can be AND and OR events.
AND nodes describe the all dependence, meaning that all children are required to be com-
promised by attacker in order for that component to be compromised. Similarly, OR nodes
describe that it is sufficient for one children to be compromised in order to compromise that
sub-tree. Sample attack tree is shown on Figure 1.2.
Once attack tree model has been created, designer can associate values for each of its
leaf nodes. The values can be of quantitative or qualitative nature. Choice whether to opt for
quantitative or qualitative values depends on the ability to define reasonable values and desired
precision level of the outcome. Most commonly used values are probability and monetary cost
of attack, and they can be both qualitative and quantitative. The values can be determined
by further researching attributes of particular attack that is represented by that leaf node.
For example, assume that one leaf node describes attacker utilizing existing vulnerability on
victim’s internal DNS server, as shown on attack tree example in Figure 1.2. This event
can be described by its statistical likeliness measured in percents. In this example, the value
is found by examining the vulnerabilities of machine that allow server to be remotely taken
over to better estimate the likeliness of this event. Similarly, we can associate cost for taking
7Figure 1.2 Attack tree representing simple DNS attack
advantage of such vulnerability.
Common attack tree analysis methods include finding selected value (often probability or
cost) at root node, or performing attack scenarios analysis. Attack scenarios [4, 3], are sets of
minimal combinations of enabled leaf nodes that lead to root access. For attack tree on Figure
1.2 there are 20 attack scenarios, each consisting of one leaf of left sub-tree and one leaf on
right sub-tree. Attack scenarios can be used for finding various additional information such as
the lowest cost attack and highest chance of success attack. Often attack trees contain custom
additional parameters on leaves, and analysis can focus on them as well. An example of such
parameter is required skill for performing an attack.
1.3.1.1 Weaknesses of Attack Trees
When modeling system using attack trees, often additional information about modeled
system is available, but limited modeling capabilities of Attack trees cannot take this valuable
information into account. This can result in a model that is less precise than optimal model
of a different approach, that manages to fully utilize input information.
8Assigning values to leaves is crucial for accurate analysis. However, this assignment is often
crude and subjective due to fact that many unknown variables influence assignment of values.
This leads to distorted outcome of the analysis. This subjectivity and inability to find precise
values is one of biggest weaknesses of attack trees.
Because of simple modeling approach, attack trees can only present static model of system
security and attacker behavior. In addition, limited constructs of attack trees fail to model
dependability between events and existence of sequencing events. If system changes through a
time, or new vulnerabilities appear, the original attack tree will be no longer valid. Thus, the
static model is valid only for a limited time.
1.3.2 Deterministic Time Transitions Petri Nets
Petri nets are often used for various system modeling due to their ability to model various
systems on a relatively high level, especially when compared to Markov chains. Petri nets are
used in modeling and evaluation of system dependability [12], multiprocessor system perfor-
mance evaluation [17], and modeling manufacturing systems and processes, but not limited
to above listed. In this thesis, we focus primarily on a specific variant of Petri nets, called
deterministic timed transitions Petri nets (DTTPN).
The definition of deterministic timed transitions Petri net is derived from basic definition
of Petri net. DTTPN [9] is a 6-tuple (P, T, I, O, M0, τ) where (P, T, I, O, M0) defines Petri
net as 5-tuple of five sets: places P, transitions T, input functions I that define arcs from
places to transitions, output functions O that define arcs from transitions to places, and initial
markings M0.
In a simplified notion, transitions ti on DTTPN can fire after specified time delay τi. In
a formal sense, τ is function that associates these time delays to each transition on DTTPN.
Additionally, we will assume that some transitions are immediate, in other words time delay
τi = 0 for some transitions.
Figure 1.3 shows simple DTTPN. This net consists of four places (P0 to P3), two timed
transitions (T0 and T1), and tokens in places defined by initial marking M0 = (1, 1, 0, 0).
9Figure 1.3 Simple deterministic time transitions Petri net (DTTPN)
After time τ0 token is present in place P1.
Often we will use notion of color to regulate firing requirements for a transition. In these
cases, some places will generate differently colored tokens. Then transitions can require tokens
of different colors in order to fire. Such nets are commonly called colored Petri nets (CPN) [9].
Other variant of Petri nets, named stochastic timed Petri nets [9] are commonly used for
system modeling. Some variants of these nets such as stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) and general-
ized stochastic Petri nets (GSPNs) assume exponentially distributed firing time for transitions.
For security modeling purposes, this assumption does not hold due to lack of evidence that
attacker behavior can be modeled by exponentially distributed time delay. Instead of using
such function for time delay on transitions, we used transitions with constant delay time. Thus,
DTTPN were chosen instead of stochastic Petri nets for our modeling approach.
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CHAPTER 2. PETRI NET ATTACK MODELING APPROACH
(PENET)
2.1 Formal Definition
In previous section, we provided overview of existing deterministic timed transitions Petri
nets (DTTPN) that are used as a basis for our modeling approach. Our approach can be
interpreted as an modification of attack trees using Petri nets as modeling tool. The goal of
PENET is to provide alternative to attack Tree modeling that addresses mentioned weaknesses
found in attack trees.
Our approach uses loosely defined DTTPN as a modeling tool. PENET model is a DTTPN-
alike net with defined set of constructs and specific times associated with each transition. Places
P represent attackers places of interest, subgoals and main goal; similarly to concept of node
employed in attack trees. Transitions T represent time delay needed for attacker to compromise
next goal. Places with token represent sub-goals that attacker has managed to compromise.
Main goal of attacker is represeted by root place, at which attacker has accomplished his goal.
Formally, PENET model is a 8-tuple (P, T, I, O, M0, A, C, R) where:
• (P, T, I, O, M0) carry same meaning as in DTTPN definion and are used to build
constructs of PENET approach.
• Parameter set (A, C, R) that replaces time delay τi in DTTPN definition with time
delays ai, ci, and ri.
We introduce three time delays used in PENET transitions: periodic arrival, compromise,
and repair times. Periodic arrival time ai models cost that incurs to attacker for each attack
attempt to some goal. Compromise time ci models time delay needed to accomplish particular
11
Figure 2.1 PENET constructs a) OR event b) AND event c) PAND event
d) dependence event e) arrival construct
goal targeted by attack attempt. Repair time ri models repair response when victim notices
that some system module has been compromised. Thus, instead of single parameter, often
probability used in attack trees, we provide finer modeling with three introduced parameters.
Constructs in PENET can be static and dynamic. Static constructs are AND and OR
gates inherited from attack trees. As their name implies, they are used to model sub-system
that can described by static structure. On other hand, some attacker behavior in a system
cannot be described with such static modeling approach. As mentioned before, notions of
sequential events and dependency between events cannot be modeled using attack trees. In
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these situations dynamic constructs of PENET approach find their use.
The common attack tree OR and AND gates are simply converted to PENET approach
[2]. OR and AND gate models with any number of input children events are shown on Figure
2.1. The structure of these constructs is intuitive; for OR construct token will be present on
top place if any transition fires. In case of AND construct, tokens must be present on every
incoming place in order for transition to fire and bring token to top place.
PENET approach introduces dynamics in the model of the insecure system. In this sense,
Petri nets are good choice as they provide various constructs for modeling dynamic behavior of
a system. Thus, any construct represented by Petri net can be used in PENET approach. This
provides additional degree of freedom to designer, as designer can develop new constructs that
suit the particular application. In this work, focus will be given to two such constructs, priority
AND (PAND) and dependency constructs. These gates are commonly found as extension of
fault trees into Dynamic Fault trees [11], and they proved to be useful in modeling of even
simple attack models.
Priority AND gate (Figure 2.1.c) models sequential nature of multiple events. This con-
struct defines that events must occur in specified order, from left to right. Dependency gate
(Figure 2.1.d) models dependence of an event upon prior occurrence of another event. The
difference between these two is that dependence construct does not require strict sequencing
between dependant and controlling event, only that controlling event has occurred. Arrival
construct [18] from Figure 2.1.e models consecutive attack attempts that occur after attack
has failed on some higher level, and attacker has to start from beginning. Factor k models
maximum number of tokens that can be present at arrival place.
2.2 Defense Modeling
Although quantitative and qualitative metrics of attacker behavior provide values necessary
for modeling, notion of defense modeling is mostly left out in existing research models. Unlike
defense tree constructs in [5], most other attacker modeling approaches ignore repairability
and defensive aspects of a vulnerable system. Most systems are repairable, both during critical
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failure state and intermediate failure states. This concept is widely used in system reliability
modeling using repair rate µ. In our context of modeling attack behavior, this means that
compromised modules could be repaired, if attacker does not move to higher level goal in a
timely fashion. When this happens, attacker is forced to start over from some lower level place
or from the start, leaf place. Repairability of a place is represented by introduced parameter
ri.
2.3 Converting Attack Trees to PENET Model
As mentioned earlier, some known information about system and attacker cannot be fully
utilized by attack tree constructs. Attack trees can be converted to an equivalent PENET
approach model. During this process it is desirable to include omitted information that will
augment the model. PENET approach has ability to improve attack tree design using Petri net
constructs and additional parameters that describe the known information. These constructs
and parameters were introduced in PENET definition.
Algorithm 2.1 lists procedure for conversion. Conversion consists of several stages. In first
stage, leaves are converted to initial places with arrival construct. In second stage, all OR
gates are converted to their corresponding PENET model (Figure 3). In next stage, AND
gates of attack tree are examined to determine whether they match priority AND or regular
AND construct of PENET approach, and then converted to the appropriate one. Next, whole
tree is examined for presence of dependencies that are not shown on attack tree. Finally, time
delays are assigned to PENET model using existing attack tree quantitative or qualitative
values and additional information that was obscured by attack tree design.
2.4 Coverability Tree Analysis
Coverability tree analysis is the first of two provided analysis methods for PENET approach.
This method is similar to attack scenario analysis introduced in [4]. This analysis is useful for
finding attacks of interests such as the most likely attack. The coverability analysis is common
analysis method for all Petri nets [9]. First step in this analysis is to construct coverability
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Input: Attack tree AT
Output: Corresponding PENET model
Assign leaves to places1
Convert OR gates to equivalent model2
Convert AND gates to PAND or AND model3
Find dependencies and connect them to rest of net4
Assign arrival ai, compromise ci, and repair ri times5
Algorithm 2.1: ATtoPENET(AT), Procedure for converting attack tree to a PENET
model
tree.
The procedure for finding coverability tree from [9] is presented in Algorithm 2.2. Based
on initial marking M0, new markings are explored until there are no more markings left to
be found. Repair places and transitions can be ignored for coverability tree analysis. Once
coverability tree has been constructed, all paths that lead from initial marking M0 to markings
Mr that are associated with root of PENET tree are of interest for further analysis. These
paths are labeled with APi.
Consider all markings paths APi from initial markings M0 to root place in PENET net
representing main attacker goal. For purpose of construction of full coverability tree it was
assumed that all at leaf places have initial marking. Generally, not all initial markings are
necessary to achieve root place, because not all transitions from leaves to root are enabled.
Thus, set of all APi consists of two subsets, subset of mutually independent markings paths and
subset of dependent markings paths that are extended with optional leaf places that are not
necessary. For example, OR constructs require only one fired transition, so each OR construct
generates multiple markings paths, and only ones with single input transition enabled are
independent. Thus, list of independent marking paths APi’ represent attack scenarios.
For i -th attack scenario APi’, with number of leaf nodes ni, Total Attack Scenario Cost
DCi and Total Attack Scenario Chance of Success DPi can be calculated:
DCi =
ni∑
j=0
ACj (2.1)
DPi =
ni∏
j=0
APj (2.2)
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Input: Initial marking M0
Output: Set of all markings Mi
Label the initial marking M0 as the root and tag it “new”1
while “new” markings exist do2
Select a new marking M.3
if M is identical to a marking on the path from the root to M then4
then tag M “old” and go to another new marking.5
end6
if no transitions are enabled at M, then7
tag M ”dead-end.”8
end9
while there exist enabled transitions at M do10
foreach enabled transition t at M do11
Obtain the marking M’ that results from firing t at M.12
On the path from the root to M if there exists a marking M” such that13
M ′(p) ≥M”(p) for each place p and M’ 6= M”, i.e. M” is coverable, then
replace M’(p) by ω (infinity) for each p such that M ′(p) > M”(p).
Introduce M’ as a node, draw an arc with label t from M to M’, and tag14
M’ ”new.”
end15
end16
end17
Algorithm 2.2: CoverabilityTree(M0), Construction of coverability tree for Petri net
from [9]
Note that number of leaf places ni varies for each attack scenario i. Index j in equations
(2.1) and (2.2) denotes leaf places that are part of particular attack scenario i. In equation
(2.1) arrival cost ACj represents monetary equivalent to periodic arrival time parameter aj .
The mapping between time delay aj and cost ACj is intentionally left out to allow for custom
mapping that is specific to the modeled case. For example, every arrival time can be multiplied
with some constant value k [$/hour]. In equation (2.2) chance of success APj represents
probability equivalent of compromise time parameter cj . The mapping between probability
and compromise time is again left out to the modeler. Example of one such mapping is
presented in case study in chapter 5.
Finally, Attack Scenario Index DIi combines left sides of equations (2.1) and (2.2):
DIi =
DCi
DPi
(2.3)
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Attack scenario index is a single quantitative measure of cost and success probability of an
attack scenario. The attack scenario with lowest Attack Scenario Index DIi represents attack
with best price to performance ratio from attacker perspective. Such attack scenario offers
the attacker highest impact for the lowest investment. From victim perspective, such attack
scenario can be considered as most likely one. Similar index is employed in [5] and called
Return on Attack (ROA). The complete procedure for finding the most likely attack is listed
in Algorithm 2.3.
Input: Initial marking M0
Output: Most Likely Attack Scenario
Construct the coverability tree1
Acquire all markings paths APi that lead to root place2
From APi acquire independent markings paths APi’ that represent attack scenarios3
Calculate values DCi, DPi, DIi for each attack scenario4
Analyze attack scenario with lowest DIi index value5
Algorithm 2.3: Attack scenario analysis
2.5 PENET Time Domain Analysis
Second analysis method for PENET approach fully utilizes novelties of our model, such as
delay times ai, ci, and ri assigned across the model. The benefits of PENET approach can be
seen from proper time domain analysis. In this analysis, all constructs and parameters will
influence the outcome.
To make the analysis more comprehensible, in this work we will assume that attacker will
take route of most likely attack, for which attacker has highest ratio between success probability
and invested resources. This path was found using coverability tree analysis method. In
general, PENET model with all leaves enabled can be analyzed, without any difference in the
procedure. Algorithm 2.4 specifies procedure for performing time domain analysis. Assumed is
that PENET model of system is available, along with parameters that quantitatively describe
the model.
Algorithm simulates attacker progress in time domain taking into account PENET struc-
ture described by various constructs and parameters. First step in algorithm execution is
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initialization where leaf places that are part of attack scenario are being recognized and their
time delay values assigned (steps 1, 2 in Algorithm 2.4).
To keep track of token arrivals at various places in various time points, priority queue
PQ stores sorted list of events evt that contain information about occurrence time τ , place of
arrival P, and required tokens R leading to transition being fired. Token table TT contains
information of token arrival and departure at each place. Every token has its own unique ID.
Priority queue and token table are created in steps 3 and 4.
Next step is to generate initial periodic events at every place i that is part of attack scenario
based on arrival times ai and maximum simulation time. These events are stored in priority
queue PQ (step 5). Note that every event represents token arrival at some place.
After initialization has been completed, execution reaches main while loop (step 6). This
loop contains two parts. In first part, steps 7 to 17, current event is being evaluated for
validity, based on whether required tokens for current event are found. If all required tokens
specified by requirements req are not found, then event is discarded, and algorithm continues
with next event in priority queue. If requirements req are met, then token table TT is updated
to reflect arrival of new token, and departure of tokens that caused firing (steps 14, 15, and 16
in Algorithm 2.4)
In second part, algorithm evaluates if current event can lead to new firings. When token
arrives at some place, it could enable firing on multiple new transitions. However, as soon
as one of such transition fires, token is no longer available for other transitions. Algorithm
handles this situation by generating events for each transition that potentially can fire and
setting event requirements req to include individual token ID. Later, when each event is due,
algorithm checks whether all firing requirements are still met. The event that has earliest start
time will consume the token, and render all other potential events invalid, which is desired
outcome.
Algorithm ends when there are no events left, or when simulation time expires.
Beside analysis for single set of values of each parameter, time domain analysis can be
performed for a range of values of specific parameters of interest, usually ones that victim or
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Locate all leaf places that belong to attack scenario1
Assign ai times on leaf places, ci times on transitions, and ri times where available2
Create priority queue PQ(evt) that stores events evt(P, τ , REQ) consisting of place3
and time of event, and event requirements
Create token table TT(P, τ1, τ2, ID) that stores tokens per places and interval of4
their presence
Assign periodic token arrival time events τi for all enabled leaves i, with period5
equal to arrival time ai and queue events in PQ
while simulation end time is not reached and PQ is non-empty do6
Dequeue first event event in queue PQ7
if event is token arrival then8
Verify that all requirements req for this event are met9
if not then10
ignore event and continue11
end12
end13
Declare token arrival time τk1 at place k of event14
Declare departure times τx2 for all places x in event evt requirements req that15
lead to this token arrival
Update token table TT with values τk1 and τx216
Determine what transitions connected to place k can fire17
foreach such firing do18
Create event evt for new transition and queue it into PQ19
end20
Update time to first event in PQ21
end22
Algorithm 2.4: PENET time domain analysis for single attack scenario
attacker have some degree of control. The influencing parameters could result in different level
of penetration, or in different time spent to reach the main goal. In a nutshell, the analysis
process is the same. Regular analysis procedure from Algorithm 2.4 is performed for every
value of parameters. This parametric simulation will be explored in remaining sections.
2.5.1 Token Propagation Logic
At each place i, single token arrives as a result of some transition being fired on time τi1,
and leaves on τi2. Time τi2 is determined by outgoing transitions with compromise time ci
that could lead to new compromises (different place), or to a repair place regulated by repair
time ri. Due to periodic nature of arrival times, multiple tokens could be present at any place.
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Figure 2.2 Token propagation in PENET model time domain analysis
Figure 2.2 illustrates the token propagation for a simple case of AND construct. Assumed
is that places i and j have single token. In this particular case, token will be in place k for
interval [τk1, τk2] determined by:
τk1 = max(τi1, τj1) + cij (2.4)
τk2 = τk1 +min(ck, rk) (2.5)
In other words, single token will go to repair place or next compromise place depending
whether new compromise takes more time than repair does. There will be two events generated
for arrival of token at place k and its departure. If there are multiple tokens available, tokens
will in general case distribute to both compromise and repair places.
General case equation for token progress cannot be specified because of existence of non-
deterministic Petri net constructs. However, our PENET approach with current set of con-
structs does not include any non-deterministic constructs. Similar to AND event case, equation
can be established for OR event when single tokens are present in both input places:
τk1 = min(τi1, τj1) + cij (2.6)
τk2 = τk1 +min(ck, rk) (2.7)
Remaining PENET constructs have trivial token progress.
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2.6 Performance Metrics for Time Domain Analysis
Performance metrics provide additional quantitative information about PENET model and
survivability of a system modeled by it. These metrics are suitable for comparing effectiveness
of various attack or defense strategies for a given system. Usually these strategies manipulate
value of some parameter that is controllable by attacker or by victim. Thus, efficacy of strategy
change can be evaluated using these performance metrics:
• Time to reach root place provides time in hours from attack start to compromise of the
root goal.
• Number of intrusions accomplished at root place specifies how many times attacker was
able to compromise root goal within given time interval of attack.
• Number of subgoals reached specifies number of subgoals compromised out of total number
of subgoals in PENET system. This goal is suitable for situations when root goal was not
reached, but some of subgoals were reached. Smaller value reflects more effective defense.
This parameter loses its meaning if it is not applied to PENET model that models the
single attack scenario.
Values for each metric are obtained by performing time domain simulation of the PENET
model, and analyzing contents of token table TT described in Algorithm 2.4.
2.7 Most Likely Attack Scenario Discovery Using Time Domain Analysis
Time domain analysis can be used to determine most likely attack in a dynamic sense.
Recall that coverability tree analysis uses static, attack tree alike model to obtain most likely
attack scenario. However, for different set of parameter values, victim can expect different
most likely attack scenario. By performing time domain analysis, if token is present on root
place, we can create attack scenario that has led to root. In this case, all leaf places that are
necessary for compromise at root place belong to most likely attack scenario AP.
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2.8 Evaluation of Survivability and Defense Strategies
Creating PENET model that precisely models the system is not end result of the PENET
approach. Based on results of simulation, new steps can be taken towards enhancing the
system survivability. In this sense, primary parameters that describe survivability, defense
effectiveness, or some other desired defense descriptor are performance metrics that will be
provided as a result of time domain simulation. Algorithm 2.5 lists procedure for improving
survivability. Survivability can be improved by tweaking some parameter(s) of PENET model,
or adding new defense constructs. Then, time domain simulation is re-ran for each tweak, until
performance metrics are improved to the desired level.
This iterative process is compliant to process proposed in Morda methodology [10], pre-
sented on 1.1. Steps in Algorithm 2.5 are similar to 10 steps of Morda methodology. Both
processes result in improved countermeasures based on analysis of attacker behavior and risk
assessment.
Obtain relevant information of attacked system and components1
Develop PENET model of system or attacker behavior2
Assign the values to parameters in PENET model3
Recognize parameters and other items of interest4
Run time domain simulation for parameter set, either on selected attack scenario or5
on whole PENET model
Evaluate and validate cyber security and survivability using output from the6
simulation
if not satisfied with output then7
Process changes that potentially improve system survivability or other desired8
metric
Go back to step 5;9
else10
Perform final steps11
end12
Algorithm 2.5: Iterative process for enhancing system survivability
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Figure 2.3 Reflector routers attack pattern
2.9 Illustration of PENET Framework
To illustrate our approach, consider Attack subtree on Figure 2.3 that is an attack tree
pattern [8] used in our case study discussed in the next section. This attack subtree can be
easily converted to a PENET approach model, as is shown on Figure 2.4. For simplification
reasons, arrival constructs (Figure 2.1.e) were not shown, but denoted with arrival time ai at
each leaf. Notice that AND root node (marking 1.2.2 ) becomes Priority AND event when
converted. From description of this attack it can be concluded that three leaf events have
to occur in sequential order from left to right, but this information could not be captured in
existing attack tree.
The PENET model of this pattern consists of four leaf places, one OR construct at place
1.2.2.1, two PAND gates with compromise times c1222 and c1223, and root place labeled with
1.2.2 goal. Parameters include arrival times for each leaf event ai, compromise times for each
transition ci, and repair times ri for all leaf places.
Arrival constructs model periodic nature of attack attempts that reoccur after attack has
been stopped because of repair efforts or timed-out attack. The formal representation adds
unnecessary clutter that can be avoided by proper notations. Similarly, repair transitions end
“in air”, representing that token is being lost after successful repair. Sequential constructs on
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Figure 2.4 a) Reflector routers attack subtree converted to PENET model
b) Reduced model for time-domain analysis
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Table 2.1 Parameter values for PENET model from Figure 2.4.b
Place / Value 12211 12212 1222 1223
Cost of arrival AC [$] 100 100K 100 100K
Chance of success AP 0.1 1 0.001 0.1
transitions c1222 and c1223 require tokens from two different places in order to fire. To separate
these tokens, introduced is notion of colored token, so for transition c1222 to fire both red and
blue tokens need to be present on 1.2.2.2 place.
Figure 2.4.a shows initial PENET converted model. Because of OR event at 1.2.2.1 place,
there are two attack scenarios. First scenario uses places 1.2.2.1.1, 1.2.2.1, 1.2.2.2, 1.2.2.3 to
reach 1.2.2 goal, and second scenario differs in first leaf that becomes place 1.2.2.1.2. In order
to come with most likely attack scenarios, values need to be fed into equations (2.1), (2.2) and
(2.3). These values are assigned in table 2.1.
Thus, for first attack scenario total attack scenario cost and chance of success are
DC1 =
2∑
j=0
ACj = AC12211 +AC1222 +AC1223 = 100.2K$
DP1 =
2∏
j=0
APj = AP12211 +AP1222 +AP1223 = 10−5
Finally, Attack Scenario Index for this attack scenario is
DI1 =
DC1
DP1
=
100.2K$
10−5
= 10.02M$
Similarly, for second attack scenario
DC2 =
2∑
j=0
ACj = AC12212 +AC1222 +AC1223 = 200.1K$
DP2 =
2∏
j=0
APj = AP12212 +AP1222 +AP1223 = 10−4
DI2 =
DC2
DP2
=
200.1K$
10−4
= 2.001M$
From these values, it can be concluded that second attack scenario is more likely, due to
having lower overall index.
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Table 2.2 Simulation results for PENET model from Figure 2.4.b
Parameter a Goal Time to accomplish Token count
value [hours] accomplished top goal [hours] on top goal
2 122 goal 24 8
4 122 goal 28 4
6 122 goal 34 2
8 1222 sub-goal N/A 0
10 1222 sub-goal N/A 0
Next, time domain analysis can be performed on most likely attack scenario. Before that,
the number of variables can be reduced by taking advantage of relations and properties of
them. First, we recognize that
a1223 ≥ a1222 ≥ a12212
due to fact that events described by these arrival times are in sequential order, so arrival time
of later events cannot be shorter than of events that precede it. In a worst case from victim
perspective, sequential attacks will arrive as soon as they can:
a1223 = a1222 = a12212 = a
Thus, all arrival times can be replaced with a single parameter a. Similarly, we can assume
that repair time is constant within same sub-system, and modeled with single parameter r.
Remaining parameter c denotes likelihood of attacker ability to take advantage of vulnerable
machines (place 1.2.2.2 ). This simplified model is shown on Figure 2.4.b.
Table 2.2 shows results of PENET time domain simulation for various values of parameter a.
The simulation was performed using simulator specifically developed for this purpose. Simula-
tor is based on time domain analysis procedure from Algorithm 2.4. Beside variable parameter
a, other two parameters have assigned values: repair time r = 8 hours, and compromise time
of c = 10 hours. Run time for generation of attacks was set to 40 hours.
From Table 2.2 it can be concluded that more frequent attacks saturate repair capabilites,
decrease time to accomplish root goal, and increase number of root goal penetrations. Another
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interesting scenario worth mentioning is when compromise time is increased to c = 100 hours.
This change could represent higher difficulty to penetrate more secure system. In this case, for
parameter a value of a = 4 hours, the best attacker could do is reach 1222 sub-goal at time τ
= 4 hours.
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CHAPTER 3. PENET TOOL OVERVIEW
3.1 Introduction
PENET Tool is a software implementation of introduced Petri Net Attack Modeling ap-
proach. PENET Tool was designed with a purpose to establish practical use of described
attack modeling effort through a single and comprehensive software tool. This purpose can
be translated to set of objectives translated to desired features: ease of use, ability to use
graphical interface to draw and edit diagrams, and ability to perform time domain analysis
and calculate performance metrics. Special attention was given to post-simulation features
that are of special value to end-user. These features assist user in a vulnerability assessment,
evaluation of defense strategies, and provide interactive tools to improve security of the system.
Secondary objective of PENET tool is to use established software engineering practices
such as object-oriented design in order to ensure quality of software and sound design.
PENET Tool was completely written in C# .NET using Visual Studio 2005 as a develop-
ment environment. It requires .NET 2.0 framework [21] to run. Because of these requirements,
it is not suitable for operating systems other than Microsoft Windows.
Primary audience of this tool is individuals and organizations who want to use our approach
in vulnerability evaluation of cyber attacks and developing defense strategies for their systems.
Secondary audience is research community desiring to learn more about attacker behavior
modeling and PENET approach.
3.2 Features
PENET Tool is a graphical user interface (GUI) application that provides one-stop utility
for designing, testing, and evaluating attack models using PENET approach.
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PENET Tool features diagram editor, file management tools, export and printing tools,
integrated time domain simulator, and post-simulation tools. In most cases, these features are
driven by user interaction.
Diagram editor provides means for drawing and editing elements and constructs of PENET
attack model. Editor allows user to add new items, edit properties of exiting items, remove
items, and move their position on the diagram. These features will be described in full detail
in following sections.
File management operations support operations with model files, such as opening and
saving files using Windows built-in interfaces, and converting XML files [22] to PENET repre-
sentations.
Export and printing features support imaging and printing operations. PENET Tool is
capable of printing diagrams and creating bitmap files from visual representation of a diagram.
Built-in simulator is based on implementation of PENET time domain analysis algorithm.
It performs time domain simulations for a given PENET model.
Post-simulation analysis module performs presentation of simulation results in a fashion
that is helpful for evaluation of system survivability and defense strategies. Defined perfor-
mance metrics are utilized for this purpose.
PENET Tool is distributed using its installer for Microsoft Windows. Installer allows users
to install PENET Tool as they would any other Windows application.
3.3 Using the PENET Tool
Figure 3.1 shows main user interface window of PENET. At user’s disposal are drawing
area, toolbar and menu bar, status bar and right- click menu.
3.3.1 File Operations
Basic file operations can be accomplished using File menu. Such operations are performed
usually on a single PENET model.
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Figure 3.1 Main user interface window
Figure 3.2 File menu of PENET Tool
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Currently, users can create new diagrams that represent PENET models, and perform var-
ious essential operations on existing diagrams: opening, saving, exporting current diagram to
an image file, and printing. Figure 3.2 shows File menu items, where all file-related operations
are stored. Most of these options are available on tool’s main toolbar as well.
3.3.2 Drawing and Editing Diagrams
Drawing and editing can be defined as a set of operations related to manipulations of
diagrams that represent PENET model. In a nutshell, PENET model is a deterministic time
transitions Petri net (DTTPN) [9] with specific parameters, but it follows almost all rules of
timed Petri nets. Thus, diagram editor is basically a Petri net graphical editor with additional
set features focused on supporting PENET models.
Built-in diagram editor is a crucial selling point of our tool. From drawing perspective,
diagrams consist of places, transitions and links that connect them into a single model. Places
are presented as circle-alike objects. Every place requires unique name, and might have optional
token arrival information, in a case of a leaf place. Transitions enable firing - movement of
tokens from one place to another. In PENET tool, as well as in traditional timed Petri nets,
transitions are either immediate or timed. Immediate transitions are shown with black filled
rectangle and represent zero firing delay time. In PENET model, transitions can be either
compromise or repair transitions, based on whether they lead to further attack or repair state.
Place, Trans., and Arc on toolbar and main application menu are provided for adding
these basic elements. Drag-and-drop interface is implemented for adding all elements. User
selects desired element on toolbar, and when mouse button is released on desired location on
the drawing space, new item is dropped there. As already mentioned, arcs connect place and
transition, and they can be added only between one place and one transition. After Arc is
selected on toolbar, two mouse clicks within selected objects will draw link between them.
Figure 3.3 shows basic construct of PENET model, AND event, drawn using PENET Tool.
There are three places (P0, P1, and P2 ), and one immediate transition (T0 ), as well as three
arcs that connect immediate transition with three places.
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Figure 3.3 AND event shown in PENET Tool
As it can be seen on Figure 3.3, some places such as P0 and P1 contain additional infor-
mation on the diagram. The label [Black, 10] means that this place regularly generates single
black token every 10 time units.
There are multiple ways to edit existing items on a diagram. On Figure 3.4 selection
sensitive right-click menu is presented. In this particular case, Place P1 is selected, and right-
click menu allows general actions and few actions specific to places only, such as Set Token
Arrival Data and Set As Root Goal. Thus, every place can have two unique characteristics:
token arrival data and whether it is a root goal or not.
When transition is selected, selection sensitive right-lick menu changes to operations re-
flecting transitions, like on Figure 3.5. Beside various Set actions, user can rotate transition
for better fit on the diagram, and edit firing rules and results. Edit Firing Rules and Results
action opens new windows as shown on Figure 3.6. These rules determine requirements for
firing particular transition, and output of successful firing. Every transition must have defined
requirements and rules for whole PENET model to be valid.
Diagram menu item that is part of main application menu bar is also selection sensitive,
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Figure 3.4 Right-click menu for selected place
Figure 3.5 Right-click menu for selected transition
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Figure 3.6 Editing transition firing rules and results
and shadows presented actions available on right-click menu.
Beside crucial features such as adding and editing items, diagram editor contains additional
features: moving, resizing, removing items, smart connect, and grid alignment. Moving feature
provides ability to move any individual place or transition, or a collection of them. Similarly
works remove feature. Resize allows any place or transition to be resized. Smart connect
ensures that arcs connect places and transitions, but not two places or two transitions. Grid
alignment aligns manually placed places and transitions to invisible grid points. See Item
Details action provides read-only access to properties of a selected object.
3.3.3 Firing Rules and Results
Firing rules are set of rules that are required for transition to fire. Firing results are
specification of output of a successful transition fire. Figure 3.6 shows firing rules and results
for a transition T0 on Figure 3.5. As it can be seen from figure, for T0 to fire, both input
places P0 and P1 have to contain at least one token: gray token in place P1 and black in
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place P0. The output of such firing is one black token to all output places, in this case single
place P2.
When places and transition are connected with arcs, PENET Tool tries to recognize firing
rules that enable transition, and firing output of it. However, this is not always possible due
to presence of tokens of various colors in incoming and outgoing places. Thus, it is necessary
to review firing information using Edit Firing Rules and Results action in any non-trivial case
that involves multiple colors.
3.4 Running Simulations and Result Analysis
Next logical step in PENET Tool use is running time domain simulations on created PENET
model diagrams. PENET Tool incorporate time domain analysis algorithm that is used for
running simulations and later results analysis. Simulations can be performed on valid PENET
models.
3.4.1 About Valid PENET Models
Valid PENET model satisfies few requirements. Although simulations can be ran on invalid
model, unexpected and unpredictable behavior may incur. First, there should not be floating
elements, such as unconnected places or transitions. Second, no immediate transition shall have
input and output at the same place. This would result in an infinite loop in the simulator.
Next, there should not be any loops solely consisting of immediate transitions. Transition
times should have non-negative values. And finally, firing rules on transitions should match
places connected to them.
3.4.2 Running Simulations
There are two essentially same ways to run simulation. Simulation menu of main appli-
cation menu bar contains Run Simulation and Run Simulation from File action items. For
former, this will invoke simulation of PENET model currently opened in diagram editor. For
later, user will be prompted to navigate to desired PENET diagram file.
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Figure 3.7 Sample PENET model diagram
Default simulation run time is 40 hours (or time units!), which represents time in which new
token arrivals at leaf nodes are being generated, and this value can changed using Simulation
menu. However, actual simulation will last until there are events in queue left to execute, or
until another threshold, maximum simulation time is reached.
3.4.3 Simulation Results and Analysis
To illustrate this subsection, we will use sample PENET model diagram like on Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.8 shows Simulation Results window that will be invoked once simulation of diagram
from Figure 3.7 is completed. This screen consists of four sections. First section provides input
parameters information such as arrival and compromise time delays for places and transitions.
Second section shows contents of token table for each place in the PENET model. Token
table (TT on Algorithm 2.4) shows each token that was present at a particular place. These
entries on each place are separated by token color. Third section shows attack trace of a
successful attack. Attack trace consists of tokens and places that were instrumental for attack
to succeed. Last section contains performance metrics associated with simulation results.
These performance metrics were defined earlier in PENET approach definition.
Beside simulation results window, trace is visually shown after simulation, like on the
Figure 3.9. Places that were part of successful attack are filled with light blue color. Trace is
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Figure 3.8 Simulation results for a sample model on Figure 3.7
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Figure 3.9 Successful attack trace with tracked places shown in blue
established by tracing all tokens that resulted in token being present at the root place. Since
every particular token table entry contains ID field, it is possible to identify all tokens that
were part of a successful attack. Trace starts with the token that is present at the root node,
and recursively looks for tokens that lead to it. For example, token at root place was result of
firing of T11 by two tokens present at place P19.
3.4.4 Security Evaluation of Survivability and Defense Strategies
Although developing a representative model of system or attacker behavior might seem to
be main goal of PENET Tool, ultimate goal of PENET Tool is to enhance the survivability of
the modeled system.
Simulation Results window provides means for victim party to evaluate survivability, vali-
date system security, and evaluate employed defense strategies. Performance metrics provide
quantitative material necessary for such analysis. It is obvious that secure system has no com-
promises at root goal place and limited number of sub-goals compromised (the more sub-goals
were compromised, the system is less secure).
The user can vary parameters of PENET model that are of interest and influence, add new
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elements that improve defense, and compare with existing results. Once simulation is re-ran,
Simulation Results form will show new input and output (trace and performance metrics) for
easy tracking how changes have affected the outcome. Parameters of interest have significant
impact to performance metrics, and their value is influenced either by the attacker or the
victim. Beside modifying parameters, defense strategy can be improved by adding additional
valid repair places. As it will be shown in our TCP SYN case study (chapter 5), repair time
significantly affects survivability of a vulnerable system.
Evaluation process can be performed systematically, and repeated if necessary until results
are satisfactory. The evaluation and validation procedure is shown in Algorithm 2.5. From
this algorithm it can be seen that process is essentially iterative.
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CHAPTER 4. PENET TOOL DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter focus will be given to internal design of PENET Tool. For easier under-
standing of design, the internal design will be described on the logical level, rather than on
the code level. In a nutshell, PENET Tool is event-driven application where actions result of
user interactions with applications user interface. In that sense, user operates on front-end
consisting of various windows forms, and back-end of application performs various calculations
and support for front-end.
To meet applications goals, various data structures are being used through the back-end.
Most distinguished data structure in application describes the PENET model, the set of Petri
net basic elements, constructs, parameters, and interactions. This structure is used by most
PENET Tool modules, for example as an input for the simulator. Externally, PENET model
data structure is converted to XML structure that manages to fully describe and capture the
PENET model.
4.2 Block Diagram of PENET Tool Architecture
Figure 4.1 shows various modules of PENET Tool and their interaction with each other.
Module interaction occurs in few different ways: the data could be shared between modules,
one module uses another, or there could be two-way communication. The major functional
modules are represented as larger and darker rectangles on Figure 4.1. By rule, minor modules
appear only as a part of major module, or represent data structure that is used by a major
module.
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Figure 4.1 Block diagram of PENET Tool internal structure
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4.2.1 XML modules
Primary purpose of XML modules is to provide permanent storage of created PENET
models. Thus, PENET models created in graphical editor will be stored as XML files. XML
format was chosen due to its ability to fully describe structure, relationship between elements,
and parameters of any PENET model. XML Parser module is used for two-way conversion
between XML file and data structures that are friendlier for further data manipulation. XML
Schema [23] is template that fully defines PENET model. As already mentioned, XML format
is able to fully capture the PENET model. This is accomplished by well-defined XML schema
file. Thus, this schema file contains definition for places, transitions, arcs, and all their prop-
erties and relationships. XML schema was created using XML Schema Definition Language
(XSD) and XML Designer [24]. Figure 4.2 shows XML schema in XML Designer. Further,
XML schema file is used as a template for every creation or opening of the XML files that
represent PENET model.
However, XML file is difficult to manipulate with in a native form. Application uses specific
PENET model data structure for all internal purposes, aside of saving to permanent storage.
4.2.2 PENET Model Data Structure
The PENET model data structure (Figure 4.1) consists of definitions for each basic element
(Place, Transition, Arc), and structures and relationships that are necessary to describe their
interactions in the overall PENET model. Firing Info structure provides information about
requirements for transmission firing, and information about result of transition firing. Token
Table structure is used to keep track of individual tokens at each place. This is fundamental
for ensuring that token progress is kept accurate.
As it can be seen from Figure 4.1, PENET model data structure is widely used in PENET
Tool: it is input for performing simulations, XML Parser uses it to create the XML file, and
drawing engine uses its information for proper display of PENET model.
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Figure 4.2 Block diagram of XML schema that describes PENET model
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4.2.3 Drawing Engine
Drawing engine is a GDI+ based [25] control that provides drawing of PENET model on
the application’s main window. Drawing engine is one of most complex modules in the whole
application, thanks to rich set of implemented features. The GDI+ libraries provide means for
easy manipulation of graphics on the display devices. Drawing engine relies on information
in the PENET model data structure for providing up-to-date display of the PENET model.
Drawing engine has its own data structures for storing items that are drawn on the screen.
This includes information such as coordinates of elements, their color and shape, labels, token
colors, fill, etc. There is 1-to-1 mapping between full PENET model data and data structure
in drawing engine used to draw elements. Interestingly, arcs are not stored in drawing engine
but computed at run time using connected place and transition information which is sufficient
to draw any arc. This approach was used because 2D coordinates of an arc strongly dependent
of coordinates of place and transition connected by it. On the other hand, some actions
performed on graphics engine propagate to PENET model. For example, removing an element
on the diagram will invoke the removal of corresponding element in PENET model, and all
arcs connected to it (if removed element was place or transition).
4.2.3.1 Polymorphism in Drawing Engine
As already mentioned, drawing engine recognizes three types of elements: places, transi-
tions, and arcs. There are quite a few common actions and properties for each element. Each
can be drawn, moved, removed, renamed, and such. In object-oriented design, there is concept
of polymorphism that is strongly applicable to this situation. Applied to this case, it means
that all objects drawn using drawing engine can be stored in a single container and that for
majority of operations theres no need to examine type of the object. Additional benefit of us-
ing single container for all elements is that at run-time various elements are added to diagram
strictly by user choice. Utilization of polymorphism has led to a simplified design.
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4.3 Implementation of the Time Domain Analysis Algorithm
On block diagram of PENET Tool (Figure 4.1) it is evident that simulation module uses
data structure of PENET model as input for running simulations. The simulator closely
follows the PENET time domain analysis for single attack scenario in Algorithm 2.4. Thus,
all structures described in Algorithm 2.4 have been implemented.
Simulator introduces new data structures used for simulation purposes: Event, Priority
Queue, and Token Table. Event structure provides information about upcoming token arrival:
place of arrival, fired transition, and what are firing requirements and results of firing. Priority
Queue is used to sort events per their execution time. Priority Queue stores events in efficient
way that guarantees that extracted first element from queue (dequeuing operation) will be the
event with lowest start time. Token Table is structure that tracks progress of tokens. Each
place of PENET model has its own token table. Each token table entry contains information
about token arrival and leave times, color, and unique ID used for tracking purposes. Thus,
every token arrival will invoke creation of new token table entry. Figure 3.8 shows contents of
such table.
The simulator is event driven, in a sense that every transition firing and token generation
are represented as single event. Every such event may lead to new events, for example token
arrival at a place may enable firing of some connected transition. Thus, at every event incursion
at some place algorithm evaluates prospective firings of all connected transitions. Simulation
ends when there are no events left in queue, or if simulation time has expired.
Consider the situation when token arrival enables firing of multiple transitions. Based on
PENET approach, the transition with lowest delay would be one that is fired, and remaining
transitions would not fire. Transition with lowest delay has its own set of rules that might
change from satisfied to not satisfied before scheduled firing occurs. In this situation, sched-
uled firing event will not be realized, but other remaining prospective transitions have to be
rechecked. It is important to state that PENET Tool successfully handles such and even more
complex cases. These cases are further discussed in challenges section.
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4.3.1 Post-Simulation Analysis Implementation
Finally, last logical module of PENET Tool is post-simulation analysis. This module is
automatically invoked after successful simulation. Purpose of this module was described in
PENET Tool overview in previous chapter. Technically, it calculates performance metrics
and the trace for completed simulation. Both are acquired by analyzing the token table after
simulation has been completed. Number of root goal compromises is simply number of tokens
registered at the root place. Time to reach root goal is simply arrival time of first entry in
the token table. Number of sub-goals reached can be learned from last firing times of each
transition that is marked as a compromise transition.
Trace path is also obtained using token table entries. Because every token entry has its
own unique ID, it is possible to trace all firings and tokens that resulted in particular token at
root place. For this purposes, every token table entry was augmented with firing requirements
(that include unique token ID from input places) that have led to that entry.
4.4 Discussion of Challenges in Implementation of the PENET Tool
4.4.1 Complex Issues in Time Domain Simulator
In a event-based simulation, it might seem that events are linearly following each other in
time domain, with events occurring as scheduled. Unfortunately, that is not a case. Consider a
PENET model consisting of two AND events, shown on Figure 4.3. At time τ = 5, requirements
for firing transition T0 will be met, and firing would occur at τ = 5 + 10 = 15. However,
at time τ = 8, transition T1 becomes enabled, and it could fire at τ = 8 + 4 = 12, which is
before firing of transition T0. Thus, in correct time-domain analysis implementation T1 would
fire, and T0 would not fire at expected τ = 15, because token at place P1 would no longer be
available.
Now consider even more complex situation, as shown on Figure 4.4. To explain point, we
will assume that there is no periodic arrival of tokens. In this situation, based on arrival events,
transition T0 should fire at τ = 15, followed by T1 firing at τ = 12, and T2 firing at τ = 11.
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Figure 4.3 PENET model with an “anomaly“
Figure 4.4 PENET model with multiple ”anomalies“
T2 firing at τ = 11 will render T1 firing at τ = 12 invalid, but firing of T0 at τ = 15 should
occur.
From these two cases we can draw conclusion that event-based simulation has anomalies,
situations when events supersede other events and make them invalid and cancelled. Specifi-
cally, within transition delay time some other event can take one or more required tokens. In
other words, between transition enabling time and actual firing time other events can occur
that disturb order of events. These situations have to be properly handled by implemented
time-domain simulator.
Practically, to ensure that simulator works as desired in presence of such anomalies, two
steps must be taken:
• Simulator has to schedule all possible firings on token level, and
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• Firing requirements have to be re-evaluated when transition firing is due.
To explain the first step, consider the PENET model on Figure 4.3 again. At time τ =
10 there are two tokens at place P0, one at places P1 and P2, and new token arrives at place
P1. Thus, there are thee possible firings that need to be scheduled: two on transition T0, and
one at transition T1. And every token present at P0 has to be treated as a separate firing
possibility. Therefore, set of events (in a general case) will be generated as a consequence
of some single event. There could be multiple events from single enabled transition if there
are multiple tokens in required places. Also, if event enables other transitions, these will get
scheduled as well.
Second step is corollary of fact that only single firing will occur for whole set because set
has one common requirement. Once one transition has used the common requirement for its
firing, no other scheduled event from the set can fire. Thus, it is necessary to check at every
firing whether requirements are still met, and to cancel events with invalid requirements.
4.4.2 Analysis of Algorithms Convergence and Complexity
It is necessary to show that time-domain algorithm converges towards solution if provided
with valid input.
In this section, we will attempt to derive algorithm’s ability to converge. In this sense, the
important parameters are number of transitions nt in PENET model, initial number of events
generated from token arrivals at leaf places ne0, maximal input or output degree of any event
d. Note that every token arrival at some place is result of a single event. Also, acyclic PENET
model is model where there are no transition firing combinations that would result in event at
same place where they started.
From one event, in worst case nt · nde0 events can be created. Each of these events has one
common requirement, and that is the initial event that enabled possibility of new events to be
generated. Once one if these events has been processed, remaining events will not meet their
requirements. Thus, out of so many events created, only single transition will manage to be
fired, and it will remove all remaining events. This translates to rudimentary rule that each
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event generates at most d new events.
If every event would generate up to d new events, algorithm would not converge. However,
if PENET model is acyclic, every event propagates in direction towards root or repair place,
and places are not being reused. This means that there will be at most ne0 · nt · d! events
generated from initial ne0 events (that appear after token arrival events at leaf places have
been processed). Thus, minimum priority queue will contain at most ne0 · (1+nt ·d!) elements.
This puts bound on algorithms complexity and proves that algorithm will converge towards
solution in case that theres no cycles in PENET model.
In a case of a cyclic PENET model with delay time in cycle larger than 0, simulation
will run between time as if there were no cycles and maximum simulation time, depending of
individual parameters of PENET model. If PENET model contains cycles with delay equal to
0, such model is invalid.
We have been shown that algorithm will converge unless there are zero-delay cycles, and
that algorithms execution is efficient if there are no cycles. In case of existence of non zero-delay
cycles in PENET model, in worst case algorithm will run until specified simulation time.
4.4.3 Additional Limitations of Time Domain Analysis Algorithm
Although design desire is to make PENET Tool 100 percent deterministic, in some cases
there will be conflicting events occurring at exactly same time. In such case, there is no rule
which event will occur, and which ones will be cancelled. Existing implementation does not
consider this case, but mechanism could be added that recognizes such situations and notifies
user that result was not deterministic.
Second issue occurs in situations of large token accumulation at some place. Because time
domain algorithm evaluates every potential firing on individual token level, this will create
large set of potential events for some connected transition. As already described, only single
event will manage to fire, and requirements for remaining events in this set will not be met.
The issue is that large number of events in the priority queue will slow down execution of
the algorithm, regardless of fact that all but one event in newly created set will have unmet
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firing requirements. Data structures that store events in priority queue dynamically expand in
run-time. Every expansion is performed by copying all events in the structure. Ratio of events
generated to fired can be over 105 for simple case of three inputs AND gate and one place
with 100 tokens present. This results in algorithm execution slowdown due to processing large
number of invalid events. It is obvious that limit can be put in number of newly created events,
because most of them get eliminated anyway due to unmet requirements. Different approach
would be to create single event for whole set of mutually exclusive events, but even in this case
large number of requirements would be part of Event data structure. Decision was made to find
compromise between lower complexness and readability on one and performance improvement
on the other side. The actual implementation has heuristic cut-off in which events generated
at single firing are limited n = 1000. Experiments have shown that this cut-off does not affect
result in any way. In other words, it is safe to assume that 1000 event combinations based
on present tokens in input places are enough for single transition. Algorithm can be further
developed to optimize these cases without theoretical loss of precision.
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CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY
In order to illustrate our Petri Net Attack Modeling approach, we will examine one of
most common distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks based on TCP SYN abuse in a case
study. In this case study, we will describe the TCP SYN attack, and based on this description
we will generate attack model by utilizing our novel attack modeling approach. Then, analysis
methods defined in this thesis will be applied to generated PENET model. To obtain simulation
results for time domain analysis, we have used earlier discussed PENET Tool that contains
implementation of time domain analysis algorithm.
5.1 Model
The abuse, described in [15], works as follows (Figure 5.1). Initially, client (attacker in
case of the abuse) sends request to establish connection by sending SYN message to the server.
Server then responds with SYN-ACK message, and keeps half-open connection between itself
and the attacker, waiting for final ACK response from the client. To keep track of all half-open
Figure 5.1 Establishing TCP connection using SYN message
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Figure 5.2 PENET model for TCP SYN DDoS Attack
52
connection, server stores in its memory list of all half-open connections. The attacker has
spoofed its source address (TCP protocol does not provide checking for validity of source of
the transmission), and server will never receive reply for its ACK message. As the server has
limited number of available connections, those connections will eventually fill up, and server
will be unable to service the legitimate users.
Figure 5.2 presents PENET model of described TCP SYN attack. Description of places
is presented in Table 5.1. The goal of intrusion attempt is to disrupt or affect regular service
utilizing TCP SYN DDoS attack. As it can be seen from Figure 5.2, model is structurally
divided into two separate entities. Each entity has to be compromised by attacker in order for
attack to succeed.
For simplicity reasons, and to illustrate attack patterns [8] often used in attack trees that
are applicable to PENET model as well, we have replaced first entity with three patterns,
shown on Figures 2.4, and 5.3.a and b. These patterns are not specific to TCP SYN abuse
and can be used for various purposes. Figure 5.2 shows how the patterns were instantiated as
places 1.1, 1.2.1 and 1.2.2.
Sub-goal 1.1, represented by attack pattern on Figure 5.3.a depicts intrusion attempts that
have goal of acquiring relevant information about victim of the attack: internal network con-
figuration, operating system of target server, whether it is susceptible to known vulnerabilities,
and such.
Sub-goal 1.2 is represented by attack scenarios on Figure 5.3.b (goal 1.2.1 ) and Figure 2.4
(goal 1.2.2 ). Botnet Recruiting Attack Pattern (Figure 5.3.b) models the ability of attacker
to recruit zombie (also known as slave, agent, bot) machines that will amplify the attack or
make it possible. The attacker first needs to obtain a list of machines that are vulnerable to be
taken over (1.2.1.1 sub-goal), and then exploiting known vulnerabilities or injecting them with
viruses, Trojan horses or worms gain root access (1.2.1.2 sub-goal). The number of machines
in botnet is not arbitrary, but significantly large number of nodes in botnet is required for
DDoS attack to have negative impact on victim’s service. We model this requirement with
1.2.1.3 (Sufficient Number of Hosts in Botnet).
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Figure 5.3 PENET Patterns a) Acquire relevant victim info pattern b)
Compromise network and/or resources pattern
Figure 5.4 PENET model of most likely attack scenario
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However, it is not necessary to use agent machines to perform TCP SYN DDoS attack;
same effect can be created using reflector routers [15] that will amplify effect of false SYN
requests by forwarding them to the victim. In this case, attacker has to follow similar path as
in botnet recruitment. First, prospective routers need to be located, and then they need to be
assigned to bot network. Finally, when satisfactory number of such routers is found, attacker
has accomplished his subgoal of creating reflector router network. This is modeled by reflector
routers attack pattern shown on the Figure 2.4.
Second entity on Figure 5.2 captures specifics of TCP SYN attack. Based on acquired
information in other two sub-trees, attacker decides what kind of attack to perform. If he/she
knows for that target is not vulnerable to TCP SYN attack, decision will be made to try
brute-force DDoS attack that is not as refined as classic one, but instead relies on brute-force
[16]. For TCP SYN attack to succeed, victim has to be vulnerable to TCP SYN abuse (1.3.1.2
goal), and volume of abuse generated must reach critical level that accomplishes desired effect
of attack. Volume of abuse is modeled with Attack Amplifier Requirements (1.3.1.1 sub-goal).
Therefore, for attacker to achieve desired effect, the disruption in connection queue, he
must compromise both parts of PENET model, where right part is specific to this attack, and
left one instantiates attack patterns. The desired effect of attack is to compromise ability of
victim to service legitimate users. As a impact of attack to victim, its network bandwidth,
processing power, or response time will deteriorate; or in worst case, service will be unavailable.
5.2 Analysis of Presented Model
The first goal in analysis is to find most likely scenario, in other words to find leaf places
that produce lowest Attack Scenario Index DI. Parameters are assigned as shown on table 5.1.
These parameters are cost of arrival AC and chance of success AP. Based on this information,
most likely attack scenario involves following leaf places: 1.1.2.1, 1.2.1.1.3, 1.2.1.2.3, 1.2.1.3,
1.3.1.1.1, 1.3.1.2, and 1.3.1.3.
The DC, DP and Attack Scenario Index DI values for this attack scenario are:
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Table 5.1 Description of Figure 5.2 with assigned parameters
Place Place name Cost of Chance of
index arrival AC success AP
1.1 Acquire relevant victim info
1.1.1 Target host vulnerability scans 1K 0.1
1.1.2 Locate servers
1.1.2.1 Automatic scanning 100 0.1
1.1.2.2 Intelligence information 100K 0.9
1.2 Compromise network and/or machine resources
1.2.1 Recruit multiple machines in botnet
1.2.1.1 Obtain list of zombie machines
1.2.1.1.1 Random scanning 1K 0.001
1.2.1.1.2 Signpost scanning 5K 0.01
1.2.1.1.3 Hit list scanning 10K 0.1
1.2.1.2 Take advantage of vulnerable machines
1.2.1.2.1 Virus infections 100 0.01
1.2.1.2.2 Worm infections 100 0.01
1.2.1.2.3 Operating system vulnerabilities 100 0.05
1.2.1.2.4 Trojan horse infections 10 0.02
1.2.1.3 Sufficient number of hosts in botnet 10K 0.1
1.2.2 Achieve usability of reflector routers 200.1K 0.0001
1.3 SYN abuse by attacker
1.3.1 SYN attack requirements
1.3.1.1 Attack amplifier requirements
1.3.1.1.1 Sufficient number of 100 0.3
hosts in botnet for TCP SYN
1.3.1.1.2 Sufficient number of reflector routers for TCP SYN 1000 0.01
1.3.1.2 Victim is prone to TCP abuse 1K 0.3
1.3.1.3 Master attacker decision: TCP SYN 0 1
1.3.2 Brute force attack requirements
1.3.2.1 Sufficient number of hosts in 1K 0.1
botnet for TCP SYN
1.3.2.2 Victim is prone to brute force abuse 10K 0.9
1.3.2.3 Master machine decision: brute-force DDoS 0 1
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DC =
6∑
j=0
ACj = 21.3K$
DP =
6∏
j=0
APj = 4.5 · 10−6
DI =
DC
DP
=
21.3K$
4.5 · 10−6 = 4.73G$
In time domain analysis, we will utilize the PENET model of attack scenario shown on
Figure 5.4. First step is to recognize parameters that will influence the outcome the most, that
are also controlable (to higher or lesser degree) by attacker or by victim. Compromise time c
= c1121 at transition that fires the place 1.1.2.1 is significant factor because it is de-facto the
entry point of the attack, and both attacker and victim can influence this delay time. Second
parameter of choice is clearly repair time. Note that repair time is not present at all places;
victim does not have repair capabilities on systems that are external to him, such as botnet
network.
Colors (red and green) were used for proper modeling of priority AND construct. PENET
parameters aj and cj were obtained from Table 5.1. Cost of arrival ACj was transfered to
periodic arrival time aj by dividing each value with constant k = 100 that gives arrival time of
a = 1 hour to leaves with lowest cost of arrival. Similarly, compromise times cj were calculated
as reciprocal values of chances of success ACj . Also, it was assumed that attacker performed
attacks on leaf places in duration of τ = 80 hours.
Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 show defined performance metrics for varying repair time r and
parameter c=c1121.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Time to root place
Figure 5.5 shows dependence of time to compromise root place of repair r and compromise
c times. Initially, small values of compromise time c do not influence the outcome because
other compromise times in PENET model play dominant role. As compromise time on place
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Figure 5.5 Time to root place compromise for TCP SYN model
Figure 5.6 Number of root goal compromises for TCP SYN model
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Figure 5.7 Number of subgoals compromised for TCP SYN model
Figure 5.8 Number of root goal compromises for TCP SYN model for vari-
able arrival time a1121
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1.1.2.1 increases beyond other compromise times in PENET model, it becomes dominant so
the time to compromise root place starts to linearly increase with c. Also, graph shows that
repair time only influence whether attack will succeed or not.
5.3.2 Number of root goal compromises
From Figure 5.6 we can conclude that compromise time c plays less important role compared
to repair time r, when it comes to successful attack. Although number of compromises decreases
as the compromise time increases, root place compromises terminate completely for small
enough repair time (2 or less hours). As expected, when no repair capabilities exist (represented
by infinite repair time), number of root goal compromises would not change regardless of
compromise time.
5.3.3 Number of subgoals compromised
Figure 5.7 shows number of subgoals reached for various values of parameters c and r. The
maximum number of subgoals reached is 11, which includes root goal. As we have seen from
Figure 5.6, for small enough repair time attacker will not manage to reach root place. In these
cases, attacker manages to compromise between 4 and 7 subgoals.
5.3.4 Effect of repair time
From all three diagrams, we can conclude that repairability and its promptness play crucial
role in keeping the system safe from TCP SYN attack. The attacker has no means to penetrate
system beyond few subgoals if repair is fast enough, in this particular case repair times r of
2 hours or less provide defense strategy that ensures survivability of a system, regardless of
attacker’s ability to decrease compromise time at the entry point.
5.3.5 Effect of arrival time
Figure 5.8 shows case when arrival time at place 1.1.2.1 was parameterized. Unlike other
simulations, here compromise time c1121 was set to constant value of c1121 = 10, and arrival
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time a1121 varies from 1 to 10 hours. We kept repair time to r = 8 hours. This situation
models attacker’s strategy to increase intensity of attacks, in such way that attacks on place
1.1.2.1 occur more often. Simulation output nicely illustrates struggle between attacker and
victim on the single resource: as soon as attacker gives enough time for repair (a1121 of 8 or
more hours), victim is able to timely repair compromise before it reaches root goal.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have presented PENET, new attack modeling approach based on timed
Petri nets. First objective of our modeling approach is to provide more precise quantitative
parameterization and advanced modeling capabilities compared to attack trees, while keeping
their intuitive features and simplistic approach. Second objective of PENET approach is to
provide modeling tool that aids user in enhancing the system survivability.
The new modeling approach tries to find balance between complex stochastic models and
static models such as attack trees. The weakness of many stochastic models is assumption
that attack behavior follows exponential distribution. This assumption has no foundation in
existing research. We have avoided such approach by using three simple timed delays to model
attacker behavior. Attack trees’ main weaknesses are subjective assignments of component’s
values, static model without notion of repairability, and limited modeling capabilities.
PENET model was defined using deterministic time transition Petri nets. Using quantita-
tive parameters that model compromise, periodic arrival, and repair times we have provided
means to create finer model of a vulnerable system. We have extended modeling capabilities by
providing additional constructs, such as dependability and sequential constructs, while leaving
open door for additional constructs that are possible due to modeling power of Petri nets. Ad-
ditionally, we provided performance metrics to evaluate various aspects such as survivability
of the system, total cost of attack scenario, and effectiveness of victim’s repair efforts.
We have provided two analysis approaches for solving and simulating the created model.
First analysis method produces attack scenarios and survivability indexes similarly to attack
trees [4]. Second analysis method is a unique way to analyze survivability of a system in a time
domain, employing novelty of our approach, such as new constructs and new delay times that
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quantitatively describe them. The output of this analysis tells us whether attacker will be able
to reach root goal, at what time, what subgoals were accomplished, and how effective were
repair efforts. We managed to provide dynamic sense what goes on during attack during its
lifetime. The proposed approach follows Morda assessment process steps [10]. Finally, through
case study, we have shown these concepts at work.
With concept of reccuring attack, we recognized new issue of optimization of defense or
attacker investment. This problem can be formally stated as how to identify critical elements
and utilize funds in recurring effort so the penetration is minimized or maximized. For other
modeling techniques, where there is no notion of reoccurrence, this problem is simpler.
Finding objective way to assign probability of attack success remains significant issue for
any attack modeling effort. PENET approach captures probability of attack success to three
parameters: compromise, arrival, and repair rates. This approach is a step forward in resolving
the issue of how to objectively, without subjectivity, assign probability of attack events. Some
other authors [19] have decomposed this probability into set of attributes such as probabilities
of being attacked, perimeter breach, being on attacker target list, etc. Related to this problem
is problem of finding probability distribution of attacker behavior. Although Jonsson et al.
[20] has provided significant effort, more research is necessary to obtain plausible results. Such
results will open door for new modeling techniques that carry increased precision in comparison
to existing ones.
Although cyber attacks are common, most modeling approaches do not utilize real-world
attack data. Instead, researchers often use either simple cases to illustrate models, or they
build generic models based on available information. Using real-world systems and attacks in
developed models would be extremely beneficial to capture strengths and weaknesses of any
attack modeling approach. Our approach would be more meaningful if it could be applied to
an actual vulnerable system.
Another research effort that involves cyber security focuses on interaction between physical
and cyber worlds during attack. In this area, researchers study consequences of cyber attacks
on some critical infrastructures such as power plant system. Petri nets could prove useful in
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this scenario as a tool that is capable of modeling both physical and cyber worlds, and their
interactions.
The proposed PENET attack modeling can be combined with attack trees to form a hybrid
model of attack trees and Petri nets. Such model would appear as attack tree, with some
constructs and events that cannot be modeled by attack trees represented with PENET model.
The advantage of such model is it captures the sophistication of a PENET model and the
simplicity of attack trees in an integrated manner.
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